Creating Conditions of Stability
in Southeastern Europe
Prospects for an Arms Control Regime

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Introduction

In the post-Cold War era, Southeastern Europe has emerged as the most conflict-prone area in Europe and one of the world’s hot-spots. In their efforts to achieve regional security and stability, states in particular regions are recognizing that means to regional stability exist, namely arms control and confidence and security building measures. These means have emerged as essential factors in preventing unintentional escalation in hot-spot regions.

This study argues that the states of Southeastern Europe must devote special emphasis to the promotion of an arms control regime in the region which will aim at achieving three particular goals, i) conflict prevention, ii) crisis stability and iii) arms race stability. To this end a hypothetical, yet necessary, political framework for organizing arms control efforts in the peninsula will be described. The study is divided into three parts. Firstly, an account of the trends and characteristics of the post-Cold War Southeast European security environment is given. In addition, the current status of the arms control enterprise with respect to both intra-state (i.e., the arrangements entailed in the Dayton Peace Accord) and inter-state conflict (i.e., the agreements concluded and implemented by Southeast European states on bilateral and multilateral level) is presented. Particular reference is made to the Greek-Turkish arms race and its consequences for the region’s stability.

Secondly, the need for the establishment of a sub-regional arms control regime is discussed, while particular issues with respect to the proposed regime objectives, guiding principles and strategies are analyzed. The establishment of an arms control regime in a region which is characterized by deep heterogeneity is a difficult task. The long journey towards the realization of this goal should therefore be based on certain guiding principles as well as on particular strategies the states of the region should adopt. The
approach to be followed, the type of relations that should characterize the behavior of extra-regional actors (both states and institutions) and the inter-relationship between sub-regional schemes and global/regional frameworks are the three pillars on which a future security arrangement should be based. In addition, certain strategies, if followed, would lead to a transformation of the region into an area where the effects of anarchy will be mitigated and mutual accountability increased.

The study concludes by recommending certain arms control undertakings on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral level for consideration by the states of the region. It is expected that the proposed arms control measures -which at the same time constitute the particular elements of the proposed arms control regime- will manage to create conditions in which a stable security paradigm will prevail.

The Post-Cold War Southeast European Security Environment

Sources of Instability and Trends of Stability

Until the end of the Cold War, the Balkans were not considered part of “Europe” as such, although geographically they are part of the continent. The traces of the Ottoman occupation, the unsuccessful attempts to modernize (politically and economically) and the diverse ethnic make up, had placed them -as some analysts argue, in the “semi-periphery”.¹ The cessation of the East-West conflict and the collapse of the Soviet bloc have had dire and catalytic effects in the region and have thus drawn the attention of the international community on developments taking place in this volatile “powder keg”.

One may argue that today’s Southeast European security environment resembles a coin. On one side of the coin, the post Cold-War security environment provides no guarantee that relations within the region will remain peaceful. With the end of the cold-war a “security vacuum” has been created in the region -especially as far as Romania and Bulgaria are concerned- which existing western security frameworks have failed to

¹ The inclusive term Southeastern Europe rather than the (exclusive) term “Balkans” is purposely used, to refer to the region which consists of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Greece, Romania, Slovenia, FR Yugoslavia and Turkey.

²See Nicos Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America (London, Macmillan, 1985) [especially chapter 1]. Mouzelis considers the Balkans and Latin America as semi-peripheries, referring to countries that are closer -in political and economic terms- to the West, than Third World countries. Under the bipolar setting Barry Buzan considered the Balkans as a sub-region of a broader European security complex. See his classic work
adequately fill. In addition, the release of the various nationalistic aspirations and territorial disputes -the most prominent one being the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, has tragically affected relations between the states of the region, hindered the development of Inter-Balkan Cooperation, as well as other forms of cooperation on a multilateral level.\(^2\)

In the post-Cold War era, the former communist states of Southeast Europe have recognized that no middle ground exists between communist and democratic systems or - similarly- between centrally controlled and a market economies.\(^3\) They have entered a difficult “dual transition”\(^4\) as they had to simultaneously change both their political and economic systems. Southeast European states (especially, the former communist ones) have faced serious problems in both areas. They remain in the so-called “hard to adjust” group of countries,\(^5\) and have only recently had to deal with social, economic and political problems that are inherent in the early stages of industrialization.\(^6\)

Given the predominance of nationalism in most Southeast European countries as well as the relative weakness of democratic institutions and liberal tradition in the former communist states in the peninsula\(^7\) there appears to be real potential for boundary disputes and the revival of historic antagonism between neighbours.\(^8\) In an environment

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\(^2\) The Cold War era has imposed in the region an “artificial stability”, which was a result of the bipolar system of “balanced confrontation”, and has also managed to enroll the Balkan states into a context of a limited but still important cooperative interaction by freezing to a large extent the various nationalistic aspirations and territorial disputes. See Dimitri Constas, “Future Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy” in Dimitri Constas-Nikolaos Stavrou (eds.), *Greece Prepares for the Twenty First Century* (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996).


\(^6\) The future of the Southeast European states will be determined by the states’ ability to deal effectively with a set of crises their societies are still facing, namely (a) an identity crisis, which refers to the ambivalent issue of these states’ return to a national identity or the development of a democratic and multi-ethnic society (b) an legitimacy crisis of the new post-Cold War political regimes (c) an allocation/distribution crisis, which regards the method that will be adopted with regard to wealth and services distribution by the new regimes and (d) the crisis of participation, which refers to a public request for the opening of the political systems and for a more balanced distribution of the political power. See - inter alia- Marilena Koppa “The New Balkan Environment and Its Effects on Greek Foreign Policy” in Dimitri Constas - Panayotis Tsakonas (eds.), *Greek Foreign Policy. Domestic and Systemic Parameters* (Ulysses, Athens, 1994) [in Greek].


\(^8\) According to Dean Katsiyannis “Perceptions and misperceptions play an important role in the escalation of competitive nationalism within the region. Misperceptions of foreign actions and intentions have developed throughout Balkan history owing to “strategic culture” that is characterized by an “Eastern” (i.e.
overburden with historic and national stereotypes such as the one in Southeastern Europe, a certain “strategic culture” has been created according to which the various ethno-national entities perceive one another as ‘a priori’ aggressive and threatening. In that context it is rather difficult to distinguish between “benevolent nationalism” and “ugly hyper-nationalism”. It may thus be argued that a series of underlying causes (i.e., historical memory, perceptions and a particular “strategic culture”) form a rather fertile ground for an additional set of immediate internal causes of structural (i.e., weakness of the state’s authority, ethno-geographic distribution), political (i.e., inter-ethnic relations), economic and social (i.e., particularities, discrimination) and cultural (i.e., cultural rights) nature to germinate. Finally, a certain amount of asymmetrical relations among the states of the region in terms of social, political, economic and military power cause additional concern.

Indeed, over the last four years, following the period of the Dayton Peace Accord, the area has witnessed a major turmoil, including political upheavals in Serbia, mass protests that brought down a government in Bulgaria, and a popular armed uprising in Albania. In fact, the core of the region changed markedly in the year after the Dayton peace accord of December 1995, although not quite in the ways envisioned by the agreement. The guns are silent but civilian implementation of the Dayton agreement remains lamentable. Bosnia may in theory be a unified state, but for most practical purposes it remains three separate countries with three different armies and administrations representing three different peoples while ethnic cleansing remains a fait accompli. In addition, the outcome of the battle between the opposing camps of the

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12 For example, the Greek GDP is higher than the sum of the GDP’s of Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, FYROM and Albania put together. On the other hand, Greece’s main security concern comes from another Southeast European state, namely neighboring Turkey although Greece’s defense spending in the 1990’s has tended to come close to half the GDP of Bulgaria, and to exceed the combined GDP’s of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. For these remarks see Dimitri Constas and Charalampos Papasotiriou, “Greek Policy Responses to the Post-Cold War Balkan Environment” in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (eds.), Greece and the New Balkans. Challenges and Opportunities (Pella, New York, 1999), p.215-217.
“Serbian community” -which could degenerate into civil war among the Serbs- will be decisive for the long-term prospects of the Dayton agreement. In addition, Serbia’s tiny ally, Montenegro, is getting more and more restless while there are clear signs of wanting to part company with Serbia, a move which could result in a bloody conflict.

Moreover, although the deteriorating situation in Kosovo (the southern Serbian province where Albanians outnumber Serbs nine to one) was for at least the last three years both the most frightening of all the cases of potential conflict in the peninsula and a clear sign for yet one more “accident waiting to happen”\(^\text{13}\), the international community has failed to deal with the problem in a timely fashion and in an efficient way. It remains to be seen as to what extent NATO’s decision -acting on behalf of the “international community” but short of a United Nations approval- to bomb Yugoslavia will lead to the achievement of the Alliance’s short and long-term objectives, namely to the return of the Kossovar refugees to their homes and to the strengthening of the region’s stability.

Needless to say, that the aforementioned blurred and unstable picture of the Bosnian imbroglio is complemented with other “zones of potential instability” (i.e. certain old minority-related and territory-related disputes) which increase instability and create difficulties for regional cooperation.\(^\text{14}\) In the “post-Dayton” Southeastern Europe there appears to be real potential for boundary disputes and the revival of historic antagonism between neighbouring states, with the dispute between two NATO allies, namely Greece and Turkey, being one of the most probable cases for conflict.

On the other side of the coin, however, the observer of post-cold war developments in the region may argue that certain trends -such as the former communist states’ “European orientation”, along with steps towards the establishment of western type democratic regimes- allow for a more optimistic view as far as the post-cold war future of the region is concerned. Indeed, there has been a noticeable shift by the former communist states (especially Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and FYROM) towards western norms, while these states’ strong desire for better living conditions have been linked with

\(^{13}\)David Philips, a Senior Research Associate at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Norway, warned in 1996: “a US Information Agency survey of public opinion in Kossovo showed that 92% of ethnic Albanians favor interdependence and 80% believe that “achieving independence is a cause worth dying for””. See David Philips, “Preventive Diplomacy in the South Balkans”, Security Dialogue, Vol.27, No.2, June 1996, p.230. See also The Wall Street Journal (Europe), May 24, 1996

\(^{14}\)Every state in the region has some ethnic or religious minority that causes friction with some neighboring protecting power. Indeed, beyond the Yugoslav theater of conflict, the Muslim minorities in Bulgaria and Greece, the Greek minorities in Albania and Turkey, the Albanian minorities in Serbia and FYROM, the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Serbia, and the Italian minority in Slovenia are but some of the potential causes of international and/or ethnic friction. See also Table 1.
a closer association with the West in general and the European Union in particular ("Eurofever").\textsuperscript{15} It is worth-pointing that although this is the dominant trend in the region, one Southeast European state, namely Yugoslavia, differs. Yugoslavia, remains a "maverick" on the peninsula, in the sense that its government policies continue to differ from the rest of the region’s states’ determined policies of Westernization and Europeanization.\textsuperscript{16}

A clear reorientation of the economies of the former communist states has already started, aiming at the development of internal economies and the establishment of the essential institutional frameworks that will provide a solid base both for economic growth and foreign investment. Undoubtedly, this hard transition has to overcome a number of obstacles, namely the lack of technology and infrastructure in general, the existing element of egalitarianism which is deeply rooted in communist ideology, the extremely high unemployment and inflation rates (i.e., the price these states have to pay for the shift from a centrally controlled to a market economy), and the old communist cadres which still remain influential (particularly in the economy). However, it is expected, that the democratization process and the reconstruction of these states’ economies will lead to the gradual political and economic homogeneity of the region.

At the same time, further development of economic interdependence, as well as the emergence of issues which call for common action and cooperation (economic insecurity, environmental instability etc.), have underlined the need of approaching the issue of security in a comprehensive and holistic way and through the disentaglement from its traditional meaning of military power.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16}All the states in the region, with the exception of (new) Yugoslavia have declared their aspiration to join both the EU and NATO.
Arms Control and Confidence and Security Building Measures in Southeastern Europe; The Current Status

Arms Control and Intra-State Conflict

The Dayton Peace Accord, despite its weaknesses and shortcomings, remains the most appropriate framework for the reestablishment of peace in Bosnia. The arrangements made through Dayton in the area of arms control highlight the relative utility of arms control measures in creating conditions of stability in post-conflict societies and states. With respect to the Dayton Peace Accord in the area of arms control, Annex 1-B provided for a regime of confidence and security building measures modelled on those of the OSCE. As far as the CSBMs process in the core of the region’s conflict is concerned, the parties have successfully fulfilled the requirements posed by Articles II & IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement regarding the application of certain Confidence and Security Building Measures and the reduction of certain TLE’s in order that “a stable military balance at the lowest level of armaments” be established.\(^{18}\) The parties that participated in the Dayton accord are still in the process of fulfilling the more general requirements of Article V, which regard the establishment of “regional stability in and around former Yugoslavia”. Thus, a link was introduced between Articles IV and V so that a sub-regional arms control agreement modelled on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty be concluded with the aim of eventually leading to a broader (Southeast European) arms control regime.\(^{19}\)

It seems that Washington’s decision that US troops remain in Bosnia beyond August 1998, when the stabilization force mandate ended, has further reinforced the confidence of all those engaged in the peace process and has removed the risk that either Bosnian Serbs or dissatisfied Muslims might start trying to redraw the map by force. However, international troops cannot remain there indefinitely to prevent a renewal of fighting by “freezing” the current state of affairs. Sooner or later, both the Americans and

\(^{18}\) It could be argued that Dayton has introduced an innovative approach with regard to the link between operational and structural arms control measures. In fact, Article II preceded Article IV, creating, in a very short time, a climate of sufficient trust to permit more intrusive measures. In particular, the implementation of Article IV was considered by the State Department as a “near total success” with the destruction of nearly 6,600 heavy weapons only in the particular region. See Wade Base, “Parties Complete Weapons Reductions Under Balkan Arms Control Accord”, Arms Control Today (October 1997), p.31.

\(^{19}\) As an arms control expert put it “success [of the arms control provisions of the Dayton Accord] will establish patterns of cooperation that is essential for this war-torn region, and assist psychologically in the return of the countries of the former Yugoslavia to Europe. Failure could call into question the credibility of
the Europeans will find themselves in the difficult position of reducing their involvement in Bosnia. What will happen then? Today, four years after the signing of the Dayton agreement, the strengthening of international action appears as an essential prerequisite to achieve greater reconciliation to help create a unified, democratic state that upholds the rule of law and adheres to international standards of human rights.

However, the active presence of the international community, in the form of a multinational, long-term force of sufficient strength, should manage to fill the gap - existing since December 1995 - between the military and civil aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord. In fact, Dayton “has *de facto* prevented the coordination of financial aid being affectively accompanied by threats of repression against any parties that do not respect the Dayton accords (the only threat being a vague possibility of suspending financial aid)”.

In other words, a single strategy for Bosnia is still needed. This strategy should be jointly planned and implemented by both EU and NATO representatives and it should account for the application of both the civil and military aspects of the Dayton accords.

In addition, a long-term and active military presence of the international community is a prerequisite for an additional reason, namely the successful implementation of the “Train and Equip Program” so that arms control measures can be monitored and enforced. Many states, including most of the US’ European allies, have been critical of the US-led “Train and Equip Program” whose aim is to provide the Muslim-Croat federation with the defensive capability to ensure a stable military balance within Bosnia. The critics argue that the Program will lead to a qualitatively superior federation force that will seek to redraw the map in Bosnia should the international presence cease. Critics say that any party is able to import new equipment or improve its capabilities as long as numerical ceilings are not exceeded while it does little to control the small arms and small artillery with which the war in Bosnia has been carried out. However, even the supporters of the Train and Equip Program, whose reservations regard the risk that the federation’s rearmament might be pursued too hastily or provocatively, agree that it should be linked with a larger regional arms control agreement which will

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encompass more of the states in and around Yugoslavia. The difficulties in accomplishing such a goal are great, given that a broad political agreement between the constituent peoples in Bosnia is now lacking while answers to the two issues that initially led to war, namely the political bases for individual rights and security in a multinational state and the functions of a common state and identity in a de facto confederation, are still pending. Thus the degree of international presence and the prospects for the “compelling cooperation strategy” followed by the international community to prove fruitful are conditional upon the aforementioned adjustments, among others.

Arms Control and Inter-state conflict

Bilateral and Multilateral Arrangements

In the aftermath of the East-West conflict, the main concern of the most important post-Cold War agreement on arms control in Europe, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) was to provide more secure and stable force balances at lower levels between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact states. Indeed CFE has managed to address a number of issues concerning surprise attacks or large-scale offensive action between East and West but did not improve Southeastern Europe’s regional military balances in any fundamental way. With CFE’s implementation, the subregional imbalances of forces that existed at the time of its conclusion have been codified. Moreover, a number of states in the region, not present at the CFE’s conclusion in 1990, such as the states of the former Yugoslavia plus Albania remained unaffected by CFE and its provisions. The inability of the CFE of codifying military balances through arms control outside the familiar East-West framework has further strengthened certain Southeast European states’ (particularly the non-NATO members) westernization and their willingness to join NATO, hoping that the Alliance would alleviate their external security problems. Three other important areas remain outside CFE’s provisions with respect to Southeastern Europe; the relatively light weaponry, the hardware that is heavier than small arms but below the standards of the CFE Treaty -Limited Equipment (TLE)

and the established limits on military personnel which are too high in the Southeast European context.\footnote{For these remarks see Tassos Kokkinides and Bronwyn Brady, “Reducing Military Tensions in South-East Europe: The Role of the CSCE”, \textit{Basic Papers} (British American Security Information Council, No.5, 4 May 1994), p.6.}

It is noteworthy, however, that the successor to the negotiations that produced the 1990 CFE Treaty, namely the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) has given a new, much broader content to arms control negotiations, focusing on the more ambitious and difficult efforts of conflict prevention and mediation. Moreover, all Southeast European states –with the exception of “new” Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia-Montenegro) which was suspended from the CSCE in July 1992- are represented at the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) and they have all been participants to the 1990 Vienna Agreement on Confidence and Security Building Measures\footnote{With the exception of Albania which became member of the CSCE in 1991.} as well as to the follow-on Vienna Documents on Confidence and Security Building Measures in 1992 and 1994. Thus, the states of the region have become parts of a system that provides a certain degree of transparency about military capabilities of activities in Europe west of the Ural mountains.\footnote{See Thomas J. Hirschfeld, “Conventional Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures” in Stephen F. Larrabee (ed.), \textit{The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security After the Cold War} (A Rand Study, American University Press, 1994), p.171. It is noteworthy that although participants to the various Vienna Documents on Confidence and Security Building Measures, certain Southeast European states (i.e., Greece and Turkey) have not abide by the V.D.’s obligations regarding the right of each side to conduct inspection and on-site visits on the territory of the other side.}

It is noteworthy that on a bilateral level, Southeast European states have proceeded to both the conclusion and implementation of a number of confidence-building agreements that complement the 1992 and 1994 Vienna Documents. More specifically, Greece and Bulgaria signed in Athens, in October 1993, the “Text of Improved Measures Complementary to those of the Vienna Document”. Indeed, the provisions of this document have gone further than those of the 1992 Vienna Document in various fields in the interest of more transparency and predictability.\footnote{The provisions of this document regard: (a) \textit{that notification of military activities will take place at a lower level than in the Vienna Document} (i.e., instead of 9,000 troops, a notification will be sent to the other side at the level of 7,500 troops including supporting forces). Furthermore, the two countries will notify each other of any activity even at the level of an augmented battalion conducted in areas adjacent to their common border in a depth of 15km; (b) \textit{more intrusive verification}; in addition to the quotas specified by the Vienna Document, this document grants each state one inspection and two evaluation visits per year with the zone of application of the complementary CSBMs. [It is worth-noting that as of October 1993, out of the 11 evaluation visits that were exchanged between Greece and Bulgaria, six (6) were conducted in the framework of the Vienna Document and five (5) in the context of this (Athens) document]; (c) \textit{early notification of mobilization activities}; More specifically, any activity involving increase of personnel strength by more than 1,000 reservists will be notified as soon as possible, but no later than 42 days in
been signed between Bulgaria and Turkey ("Sofia Document")\textsuperscript{29}, Albania and Turkey ("Tirana Document")\textsuperscript{30}, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey ("Skopje Document"), Albania and Bulgaria, Bulgaria and Romania ("Veliko Tarnovo Document")\textsuperscript{31} and Romania and Hungary.\textsuperscript{32}

On a multilateral level, the advancement of regional cooperation in the area of arms control had more recently taken place in the context of broader institutional arrangements, such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). A number of Ministers’ of Defense of Southeast European states meetings took place during the last three years with the aim of further promoting regional security cooperation by the adoption of certain arms control measures. The most important -on a multilateral level- accomplishment remains the decision in the Inter-Ministerial Defense Meeting in Skopje on 26 September, 1998 for the establishment of a

\textsuperscript{29}The Sofia Document was signed in December 1991 and it was designed to strengthen security and confidence along the Bulgarian-Turkish border. As part of this confidence-building effort, Turkey moved one battalion of ground forces and a tank battalion back from the Bulgarian-Turkish border in July 1992. In November of this year, the Edirne Document on additional confidence-building measures was signed by the two states’ Chiefs of the General Staffs. The Edirne Document supplements the Sofia Document in the sense that lowers the threshold for the reciprocal exchange of notification of and invitation to military maneuvers. See Stephen F. Larrabee, “The Balkans” in Zalmay Khalilzad (ed.), \textit{Strategic Appraisal} (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), p.111.

\textsuperscript{30}The “Tirana Document on Mutually Complementary CSBMs and Military Contacts” was signed in February 1995 between the Chiefs of General Staffs and regarded (a) the mutual invitation of observers, at least twice a year, to the two states’ major military exercises and (b) the promotion and facilitation of contacts between relevant institutions, including -among others- visits at flag and staff officer levels; naval visits; joint exercises; exchange of personnel and exchange of visits. It is worth-noting that prior to Tirana document, a bilateral military agreement was signed in Tirana, in July 1992, and regarded Turkish aid for the modernization of the Albanian Army and for the training of the Albanian officers. See Louis Zanga, “Albania and Turkey Forge Closer Ties”, \textit{RFE/RL Research Report} (March 12, 1993), pp.30-33. It is worth-mentioning that the particular military agreement between Albania and Turkey did not have a confidence building effect on neighboring Greece. The agreement was perceived in Athens as a potential threat to Greece’s security emanating from the establishment of a “Muslim arc” on the country’s northern border.

\textsuperscript{31}The agreement on “Mutually Complementary CSBMs and Military Contacts” was signed between the Ministers of Defense of the two countries in December 1995. It -inter alia- regards: CSBMs and improved military information exchange measures to be implemented in a specified zone of application along the Romanian-Bulgarian border; evaluation visits to the other state territory; prohibition of certain military exercises involving units above the level of a battalion task group in areas adjacent to their common border with a depth of 15 km, meetings by appointed representatives of the two parties annually alternately to assess implementation etc.

\textsuperscript{32}This agreement on “CSBMs Complementing the OSCE Vienna Document of 1994 and on the Development of Military Relations between Hungary and Romania” was signed in September 1996. By setting a series of criteria and measures for early notification to certain zones of application, the agreement aims at the expansion of the scope of military information exchange, the enhancement of the existing CSBMs, the further development of the military cooperation and at the increase of the number of evaluation visits and inspections.
Multinational Peace Force in Southeastern Europe (MPFSEE). The follow-on meetings of military experts in Istanbul, Turkey in November 1998, in Bucharest, Romania in February 1999 and in Plovdiv, Bulgaria in April 1999 have clarified a number of issues regarding the location of the Multinational Peace Force Headquarters, the nationality of the Force’s Commander as well as the location of the MPFSEE’s Politico-Military Steering Committee (PMSC).

However, as the Kosovo crisis has amply demonstrated, it is difficult for the concept of a Southeast European peacekeeping force to be successfully implemented. It seems that, although not in the minds of its inspirers, the creation of the Multinational Peace Force in Southeastern Europe will manage to serve more as an additional vehicle for the former communist Southeast European states’ incorporation into western security institutions (especially NATO) rather than as the regional body able to pursue peacekeeping operations in its own region. It is characteristic that the main goal of the MPFSEE remains the enhancement of contacts, cooperation and interoperability between the Armed Forces of the states of the region while the participation is open to all able and willing NATO and PfP countries of the region.

Finally, it is needless to say, that the accession of all Southeast European states to yet another multilateral framework, namely the Open Skies Treaty\(^3\) (only Romania has so far signed an Open Skies accord with Hungary) would be an additional confidence-building measure of particular importance.

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**The Greek-Turkish Arms Race**

For the last twenty-five years an arms race -that has very much gone against the European trend, is being followed by the two main protagonists in Southeastern Europe, namely Greece and Turkey. As a result of the Turkish announcement in April 1996 of a ten-year $31 billion armament program, Greece responded in November of that year with

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\(^3\)The Treaty on Open Skies was signed in 24 March, 1992 by the NATO states, the former members of the WTO, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia. It has not yet entered into force. Its main objectives are: to promote greater openness and transparency in military activities; to improve the monitoring of current and future arms-control provisions; to strengthen crisis prevention and crisis management; and to provide for aerial observation based on equity and effectiveness. According to the Treaty each state shall accept, and may conduct, observation flights on the territory of other signatories. It has been argued that the Open Skies Treaty could be used -possibly in a modified form- to enhance transparency in the former Yugoslavia. See Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Conventional Arms Control and European Security”, *ADELPHI Paper No.301* (IISS, Oxford University Press, 1995), p.19.
a $14 billion (4 trillion drachmas) program for the next five years, 1996-2000.  
Greek defense expenditures are approximately 5.6% of GNP ($5 billion), the highest among NATO members, while Turkey’s are approximately 4.5% of GNP ($7.5 billion).

Needless to say that military expenditures constitute a heavy burden for the Greek economy, at a time when Greece is implementing an economic austerity program in order to join the next phase of European Monetary Union.  
Defense expenditures are, to a certain extent, responsible for the country’s budget deficit, as well as Greece’s low level of social services. According to Greek decision-makers, the existing arms race has also resulted in an imbalance of power in favor of Turkey, Greece’s inability to keep up with the current arms race, and the risk of Greece distancing itself from EU convergence prerequisites. On the other hand, the existing arms race places a very heavy burden on Turkey as well, which is faced with chronic high inflation and serious social and political problems. Many Greek officials and analysts, however, believe that the Turkish civil-military establishment maintains a relatively free hand in imposing extremely high defense expenditures on a weak society.

In addition, Greek policymakers see Turkey’s significant military capabilities as backing its “non-friendly” intentions. It is worth noting that, since 1991, Turkey has launched an impressive modernization program of its armed forces. It has acquired advanced fighter (a fleet of up to 320 F-16s) and transport aircraft, attack and transport helicopters, Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFVs), Multiple Launcher Rocket Systems (MLRS), frigates, submarines, etc., and it has also developed the capability of co-producing some of these weapon systems. Such a sizable increase in military expenditures, in an era when other European states, the US, and Russia have been cutting their defense budgets in an effort to benefit from the "peace dividend," is a cause for concern for neighboring countries, including Greece.

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34 See the White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces: 1996-7, Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, p.107. According to this document, “1.95 trillion drachmas is expected to be disbursed until 2000, immediately after the placing of orders, and the remaining according to deliveries.”


37 Turkey’s decision to domestically produce such sophisticated equipment entails considerable financial sacrifices. The cost of the modernization program would probably exceed $50 billion for a period of fifteen
interesting to note at this point that when the outside powers who are arming the two states in their arms build-up (e.g., Norway, Denmark, Germany, US) attempt to link further arms exports to, for instance, improvements in human rights, or efforts to enhance regional stability, both countries proceed to the “diversification of their arms procurement networks”—which simply means that they turn to other suppliers.\footnote{For these remarks, see Christopher Tuck, “Greece, Turkey and Arms Control”,\textit{Defense Analysis} (Vol.12, no.1, 1996), pp. 25-26.}

Moreover, a series of \textit{institutional} problems, which emanate from a series of gaps and limitations on existing multilateral treaties and are of particular importance, further exacerbate the existing Greek-Turkish security dilemma. A brief examination of the CFE Treaty illustrates how Greece and Turkey have been able to \textit{quantitatively} and \textit{qualitatively} augment their holdings, due to certain deficiencies within the Treaty stemming from the conditions at the time of its conclusion.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 26-28.}

For example, although the terms of the Treaty have asked for the reduction of battle tanks (28 for Turkey and 144 for Greece), the Treaty Limited Equipment (TLEs) limits allowed some significant expansion in other areas, such as Personnel Carriers (APCs) and aircraft (Turkey could increase by 1,618 its number of APCs and of its aircraft by 239, while Greece could increase its APCs by 893 and its aircraft by 181).\footnote{See S. Koucik & R. Kokoski (eds.),\textit{Conventional Arms Control: Perspectives on Verification} (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994), pp. 27-30.}
The CFE Treaty has thus sanctioned a general increase in the weapons stocks held by each side, an opportunity that neither side has missed. Besides these quantitative increases, the CFE Treaty has not halted the development of a qualitative arms race, since it placed limits on the \textit{number} of systems held, but generally not on their \textit{capabilities}. It was thus possible for example, to replace single-barreled artillery pieces with Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) on a one-for-one basis. In fact, it is precisely this gap in the CFE Treaty that both countries have taken advantage of, with the result of further reinforcing their military capabilities, instead of reducing them.

In addition, the move towards qualitatively and quantitatively better forces was aided by NATO’s Cascade Program,\footnote{After the Cold War’s end, NATO policy made provisions for the transference of the comparatively more sophisticated weapon systems of certain countries (e.g., United States, Germany), which had to be reduced under the CFE Treaty, to those NATO member-states that had obsolete weapon systems, in order to} under which Greece and Turkey became the
principal recipients as the countries with the largest stocks of old TLEs. It is characteristic that, with regard to the volume of weapon systems, by the end of 1992, Greece and Turkey were the greatest importers of military material worldwide. As a result, through NATO’s Cascade Program, which was completed in 1995, Turkey’s modern military materiel (TLEs) grew by 25% (!) over 1990 levels, the year that the whole process of arms reduction in Europe was launched through the CFE Treaty.42

Last but not least, another serious gap in the CFE Treaty is that it does not apply to naval forces, which, given the strategic importance of the Aegean Sea to both sides, is a major shortcoming. The result has been a naval arms race occurring at a time when Russia has ceased to be a major player in the Aegean, and, as a consequence, Greek decision-makers are inclined to think that the focus of Turkish naval policy is primarily Greece, and vice versa.

It should be noted, however, that “a relatively developed arms control regime”43 already exists between Greece and Turkey, in the sense that both countries are particularly familiar with issues of transparency and confidence building, in that they have both signed a series of arms control agreements, including the Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), that of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Vienna Documents, and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. These are agreements that compel both countries to exchange detailed information on the stockpiles and procurements of their weapon systems. Moreover, in regard to the more recent history of the two countries, other elements that could be mentioned as integral parts of this “relatively developed security regime” are the Papoulias-Yilmaz Agreement on Confidence Building Measures, better known as the Vouliagmeni Memorandum (May 17, 1988, Athens), as well as the Agreement concerning the Guidelines for the Prevention of Accidents and Incidents on the High Seas and in International Air Space (September 8, 1988, Istanbul). Similar “elements of security regimes” existed between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era,

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according to which the two parties were committed to show self-containment and respect of the *vital* interests of the other part.\(^{44}\)

**Developing an Arms Control Regime in Southeastern Europe**

The establishment of an arms control regime in Southeast Europe appears as the only means for a more stable security paradigm to prevail in a region which fulfills the essential characteristics of a *regional subsystem*, i.e., (a) there is a regularity and intensity of interactions, in a way that change in one part affects other parts; (b) the actors are generally in geographic proximity; (c) there is external and internal recognition of the subsystem as being distinctive, and (d) there are at least two actors or more involved in the sub-system.\(^{45}\) Indeed, the establishment of a “security regime”\(^{46}\) in Southeastern Europe in a particular issue area, namely arms control can have as its main task *the management of the change* that occurred immediately after the end of the bipolar setting and still takes place in Southeastern Europe. The consequences of that change have been made apparent so far by the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation and most recently


\(^{45}\) See R. Thomson, “The Regional Sub-system. A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory”, *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol.17, No.1, March 1973), pp.92-101. See also Louis J. Cantori and Stephen L. Spiegel, *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach* (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1970). In order to take account of the overlap between subsystems and boundary diffuseness in regional membership, Cantori and Spiegel made an interesting distinction in (a) a core sector or a principal focus of international politics within a given region, (b) a peripheral sector including states that play a role in the political affairs of the region, which are separated from the core as a result of social, political, economic, organizational or other factors and (c) an intrusive system which takes account of external power whose participation in the sub-system is important.

\(^{46}\) Stephen Krasner’s definition of regimes remains the most influential. According to Krasner, “Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.” See Stephen Krasner (ed), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2. More specifically, security regimes do not constitute any form of agreement or contract, but rather refer to a coincidence of interests between opposing countries. Nevertheless, in order for even tacit cooperation to be maintained between the countries that will create a security regime, it is necessary that quite a high level of reciprocity with regard to participating states’ intentions, the integrity of their communication channels, as well as specific values, be attained in advance. See Charles Lipson, “Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?”, *International Organization* (Vol.45, No.4, Autumn 1991), pp. 495-538; and Adam Garfinkle, “An Observation on Arab Culture and Deterrence: Metaphors and Misgivings” in Efraim Inbar (ed.), *Regional Security Regimes* (State University of New York Press, New York, 1995), p. 202.
with the war in (or for) Kossovo. However, other existing or potential conflicts of either intra-state or inter-state nature still dominate the region’s security agenda.

Objectives and Utility

The objectives of an arms control regime in Southestern Europe are obviously connected with the sources of potential or real conflict in the region. Sources that are of structural, regional and -mainly- internal nature. All these negative elements call for the establishment of an arms control regime that would significantly contribute to a much improved atmosphere of political co-operation, with relations among the states being normalized and stabilized. In addition, in the post-Cold War era there is a general consensus that arms control should shift from its traditional function, namely measuring military balances to preventing military conflict.\(^{47}\)

Thus, there is a need for the applying certain arms control measures with the aim of preventing future conflicts by avoiding returning to historic patterns of conflict (especially with respect to the fragile situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as to the internal situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and by overcoming the current dangerous arms race spiral (especially with respect to the Greek-Turkish relations).

The proposed arms control regime has three particular objectives to accomplish, namely conflict prevention\(^ {48}\), crisis stability\(^ {49}\) and arms race stability.\(^ {50}\) In fact, a Southeast European arms control regime will have the particular function “plotted” in the following figure:


\(^{49}\)Crisis stability refers to the ability of an adversarial military system to remain under political control, even when decision-makers take the possibility of war into account.

\(^{50}\)Arms-race stability refers to the propensity of a system to avoid a spiraling armaments dynamic. Needless to say, the lower the degree of arms-race stability, the higher the probability that the states involved will carry out an arms race against one another, with the amount of available resources constituting the only limit to their military expenditures. See, among others, Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* (Vol.30, no.2, January 1978), pp. 167-214.
Particularly, in Southeastern Europe there is a need for preventing conflicts from occurring through misunderstandings or miscalculation by adopting measures, namely confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs)\textsuperscript{51} that increase transparency and openness and reduce the risk of surprise attack and by developing regional institutional arrangements that enhance security and the process of arms control. Of course, one should have in mind that opting for a strategy centered on the creation of conditions of stability and security in the post-Cold War Southeastern Europe is a complex and evolutionary process in which different security interests must be coordinated and accommodated. Accordingly, the journey to realizing this strategy will be long, involving various phases of implementation.

The proposed arms control regime will aim at the lessening of ‘zero-sum’ mentality which dominates inter-state and intra-state relations in the region and the reduction of both the incentives and the prospects for the escalation of apparent or/potential disputes by allowing the discussion of problems before they transform into crises and eventually provide a set of sub-regional norms of conduct. Thus, it will constitute the essential politico-military framework in order a substantive regular dialogue be established among the states of the region about how they should conduct their future relations with the aim of furthering a cooperative security environment.

\textsuperscript{51}The concept of Confidence and Security Building Measures has emerged, in the post-cold war era, as an essential means in preventing unintentional escalation in conflict-prone areas. CSBMs are designed to reduce and even eliminate the mistrust, fear, tension and hostilities enhanced by lack of reliable information and aggravated by subjective misconception. As Michael Krepon points out: “CSBMs can be a growth industry in the 1990s because they are flexible instruments that allow national leaders to adapt to a radically transformed security environment”. See Michael Krepon, “The Decade for Confidence-Building Measures” in Michael Krepon et al (eds.), \textit{A Handbook of Confidence Building Measures for Regional Security} (Henry Stimson Center, Washington DC., January 1995), p.2.
Needless to say, that the creation of an arms control regime does not guarantee an end to conflict. However, it constitutes a fruitful means of dealing with differences by creating mechanisms that offer alternatives to conflict. In addition, what an arms control regime can do is to encourage and, most importantly, institutionalize cooperative outcomes, by making rational propositions that will make all sides realize that the costs involved in continuing the current competition exceed the benefits or possible payoffs a state could achieve if a more cooperative relationship were chosen. Thus, an arms control regime must be seen as a vehicle that will only have a conflict prevention utility but it could also bring about the limited learning that is a necessary, although not sufficient condition for conflict resolution.52

Especially with respect to the Greek-Turkish conflict, the main objective of the proposed regime would be the regularization of the states’ action with regard to a specific “issue area,” that of arms control, which can, at a first stage, concern the agreement between the two opponents on the adoption of specific measures that would eliminate the possibility of “surprise attack” and promote stability (crisis stability) through the prevention of war caused inadvertently by miscalculations and/or accidents (accidental war).53

At the same time, it may constitute the most appropriate substratum for “the next step” in Greek-Turkish relations, since it may go beyond the limited field of a stability that would solely concern weapons procurement (i.e., arms-race stability). In other words, the establishment of an arms control regime could accelerate the “learning process”54 in the competitive Greece-Turkey relationship and lay down the preconditions for the attainment of political stability. This concerns the absence of the very motives that might lead two countries into crisis and possible war, and may be achieved by: eventually changing the very rationale of the competitive relationship, resulting in war not appearing that attractive a solution, functioning as a “learning process” that will re-determine the

52 It must be noted that with respect to the Greek-Turkish conflict, the proposed arms control regime must also carry the potential both to foster better stabilization of the conflict and facilitate the conditions for its resolution and, thus, minimize the risks inherent in any institutionalization of a conflict; namely, that the states involved might think that the benefits of institutionalization outweigh the benefits of resolution of the conflict.
misperceptions of the one state vis-à-vis the other; and creating new opportunities as well as mechanisms through which the two states will attempt to settle their differences. The “educational utility” of arms control in correcting misperceptions and contribute to the lessening of fear cannot be limited to the Greek-Turkish relationship but it may concern both inter-state and intra-state relations throughout the region.

For addressing all the aforementioned objectives of the proposed arms control regime certain “operational” and “structural” arms control measures both in a bilateral and multilateral level could be promoted in the region. However, establishing a viable and effective arms control regime in Southeastern Europe, which is still characterized by deep heterogeneity in political, military, economic, cultural and religious terms is a serious challenge and a rather difficult task. How could real confidence and

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55 An arms control regime can be very useful after its establishment, particularly during periods of relatively unconstrained rivalry, because it can provide regulation; encourage and institutionalize cooperative outcomes; reduce the possibility of surprise attack, and ultimately to diminish the use of force. More specifically, they consists of measures to increase transparency and mutual trust, to avoid misperceptions and misunderstandings, to restrain military activities (mobilization exercises, training, etc.). Notification, inspections, etc. are the fundamental instruments of this operational aspect of arms control, which especially since Helsinki 1975, has had a growing importance at least in Europe. Operational arms control try to increase not only the knowledge of the behavior of “the other”. The Vienna Documents of 1990, 1992 and 1994 on Confidence and Security Building Measures belong to this category of arms control.

56 “Operational arms control” refer to efforts to prevent conflict/crisis by misunderstanding or miscalculation, to reduce the possibility of surprise attack, and ultimately to diminish the use of force. More specifically, they consists of measures to increase transparency and mutual trust, to avoid misperceptions and misunderstandings, to restrain or put under control military activities (mobilization exercises, training, etc.). Notification, inspections, etc. are the fundamental instruments of this operational aspect of arms control, which especially since Helsinki 1975, has had a growing importance at least in Europe. Operational arms control try to increase not only the knowledge of the behavior of “the other”. The Vienna Documents of 1990, 1992 and 1994 on Confidence and Security Building Measures belong to this category of arms control.

57 “Structural arms control” refer to reductions in military manpower as well as conventional [and unconventional] weapons, ultimately producing major force reductions. So they can either limit and regulate an existing arms race or can reduce the existing level of armaments, especially those considered offensive (e.g., tanks, fighter bombers, amphibious forces, etc.)

58 As a prominent figure of international regimes has pointed out “...if states view politics as a zero-sum struggle, if they actually desire wars of expansion, if they cannot seek joint gains for domestic political reasons, if they fail to recognize that their policy choices are interdependent, if they cannot distinguish each other’s offensive and defensive weapons and military deployments, if they are unwilling to reassure other states by permitting adequate verification, then the prospects for security regimes will be poor indeed.” See Janet Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security Regimes and the Management of International Conflict,” International Journal (No.40, Autumn 1985), pp.599-617, as quoted in Charles Lipson, “Are
security be built between the states of the region when both elements are so badly lacking within most of those states? In addition, some Southeast European arms control experts are not optimistic about the particular (in)ability of arms control measures to address the particular problems of “internal nature” that characterize the post-Cold War Southeast European security environment. However, the *indirect utility* of particular arms control measures concluded on a regional level is acknowledged with respect to their capability to affect certain external security aspects of problems emerged within the states. 59

**Guiding Principles**

*Based on a Comprehensive Approach*

Given that the current threats and risks to a stable security paradigm in the region are of a structural (systemic), regional and -mainly- domestic nature it seems obvious that a *synthesis* of the neorealist and neo-liberal perspectives would be the most appropriate way to tackle today’s Southeastern European instability. Specifically, the convergence of the neo-realist and neo-liberal perspectives suggest that the region lends itself -on the one hand, to a long-term political process (a norm-building effort) that will lead to a regular dialogue on political and security cooperation among the states of the region60 and -on the other hand, to a greater role in conflict prevention and crisis stability under the conditions of the post-Cold War setting by the introduction of certain arms control measures. 61

The need for a *comprehensive approach* that accounts for a synthesis of neorealist and neoliberal propositions for increasing stability in the area suggests that Southeast European states could be increasingly helped in their efforts to introduce certain arms control measures (especially operational ones) in the region by two particular “guides”: firstly, the findings of the empirical evaluation of the confidence-building enterprise in various regions of the world and secondly, the lessons which can be drawn from the “European experience”, that is the confidence-building enterprise in the East-West context. Both issues will serve not only as important sources of inspiration but mainly as

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guides for certain operational (and structural) arms control measures that will be
presented in the last part of this study.

Although one may argue that the “European CSBMs” are an East-West “product”
that cannot be exported to other regions it is still valid that knowledge of the particular
reasons which account for the success of the European CSBMs enterprise could constitute
certain guides for the Southeast European states for avoiding those measures or initiatives
which proved counter-productive in the “European CSBMs process”. Similarly, although
it is correct that each region must choose its own CSBMs model, it is also acceptable that
measures developed in one region to deal with border security or fears of surprise attack
can be of interest to other regions where similar concerns exist. Consequently, the
suggestions emerging from the empirical findings of the CSBMs enterprise around the
world could be of great interest, especially to states that are paying a great deal to the
benefits of the CSBMs enterprise without recognizing the limits of the concept.

The empirical evaluation of the CSBM enterprise in various regions of the world has led to a series of particular suggestions with respect to the CSBMs contribution to
regional security:
I. That CSBMs can bring benefits is undeniable. But, even supporters of CSBMs need to recognize the limits of the concept.
II. It is not that CSBMs are not without value, but rather that they need to be as specific as possible.
III. While beginning a discussion and/or negotiation with rival states or potential adversaries can have important merits, relying solely on the process is a mistake.
IV. If a first or newly negotiated agreement is not put properly into practice, the result may be to destroy whatever “confidence” has been built during negotiations.
V. Successful CSBMs require implementation to be straightforward and reassuring for all parties. Anything less than forthcoming and comprehensive implementation can create problems.
VI. CSBMs must not be developed to the detriment of other diplomatic or security initiatives. In consequence, CSBMs must not be seen as necessary prerequisites but as stepping stones to prominent objectives.

VII. Setting a CSBM policy implies *embracing the status quo*. Unless such a course of action is clearly identified, it should be recognized that CSBMs are unlikely to reduce the source of the security threat.

The successful establishment of *operational arms control* measures (i.e., Confidence and Security Building Measures) in Southeastern Europe presupposes that a certain pre-condition should be fulfilled in advance. Namely, that all states in the region should enter into agreements in which they will pledge themselves *not to alter the territorial status quo* by military means and to *refrain from the use of force or the threat of the use of force* against each other. Of course, in the case that one of the states of the region adopts a revisionist policy vis a vis the other states in the region, the (inherent) limits of the arms control mechanism are highlighted since such a behavior cancels the vital prerequisite for the effective establishment of the CSBMs in the peninsula.

The European experience,\(^\text{63}\) is an additional source of inspiration and an important guide for regional arms control initiatives. This is mainly due to the fact that -whether in

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\(^{63}\)The concept of confidence -and security- building evolved in the latter half of the 1950s during negotiations concerning disarmament and arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union. It took formal shape in the context of the Conference and Cooperation in Europe when confidence-building measures were included in the Helsinki Final Act, agreed upon by the Conference in 1975. The Act contained a number of confidence-building measures, including the encouragement of nations to notify each other of, and invite observers to, certain military activities that take place on land in Europe. The CSBMs included in the Helsinki Final Act are referred to as those of the “first generation”. At the Madrid follow-up meeting in September 1983, the participating nations of the CSCE agreed to convene a conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (C.D.E) and a mandate for a “second generation” of CSBMs was adopted, which were to be military significant, politically binding and adequately verified. These more far-reaching CSBMs were adopted in 1986 by the CSCE participating nations in their declaration referred to as the Stockholm Document, which achieved significant progress with regard to transparency of military activities and verification. The end of the traditional East-West conflict as well as the new climate of confidence and cooperation in Europe, resulted in a commitment to military transparency inconceivable during the Cold War era. In 1990, the follow-up meeting of the CSCE was brought to a conclusion with the participants’ adoption of the Vienna Document, which included an undertaking for further development of CSBMs in Europe and the establishment of a Conflict Prevention Center. Hence, the CSBMs concept will be further developed (Vienna Documents ‘92 & ‘94) by covering military activities in the air (Open Skies Treaty, 1992) while certain states of the OSCE will recently take great efforts in order to broaden the naval CSBMs context (with reference to reductions in naval forces and limitations in naval activities) as well as to achieve greater transparency as far as both the structure and the operational parameters of the Armed Forces of the OSCE member-states are concerned.

Korea, South Asia, Central America, the Pacific, or the Middle East, it seems there is a clear correlation between the types of measures being proposed, negotiated, or implemented and the operational arms control developed in Europe. While the details of their use have varied, particular Confidence and Security Building Measures have been perceived as relevant to the security concerns of regions characterized by diverse political, economic, historical, and cultural elements.

In addition, while all cases are indeed unique, the roots of the Cold War, as well as the factors that first prompted the European states to risk limited forms of cooperation, can be viewed in more generic terms that permit comparison to other conflicts. Here the most important lessons which can be drawn from the European experience are reviewed.64

a) Successful CSBMs negotiations can be a protracted process due to underlying conflict of interests between rivals.

b) The East-West CSBMs experience followed a step-by-step progression, suggesting a clear linkage between political developments and successful negotiations.

c) Breaching the wall of secrecy that adversaries tend to erect around their military establishments and activities was the single most important contribution made by initial CSBMs agreements.

d) The experience of Europe suggests that timing is critical (i.e. unless conditions are ripe for confidence-building, even limited attempts at accommodation may end in failure.)

e) The European experience underscores the need to consider the linkages between CSBMs and other processes of conflict management.

f) Last, but not least, the process of negotiating the CSBMs in the OSCE clearly suggested that political developments constitute the conditio sine qua non for further progress in the CSBMs process. Both the initiation of the process and its continuation

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and refinement appear to have been closely linked to key political developments in East-West relations.\textsuperscript{65}

The Role of Extra-Regional Actors

The Yugoslav conflict dealt a serious blow to the image and credibility of the European Union and to its aspiration of being a decisive factor in the emerging political order on the European continent. With the outbreak of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the EU sought to meet its first major common European foreign policy challenge. The opportunity arose for the EU to create new institutional links with the eastern European countries, testing the much needed and anticipated EU Common Foreign and Security Policy that was hailed at the Maastricht conference in 1991. The Yugoslav crisis, which quickly deteriorated, caught the EU off-guard. The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany, and subsequently the entire EU, made apparent the latter’s ineffectiveness in playing a major political role in the region as a unitary force.\textsuperscript{66} This was due to a series of reasons: the diversity of EU members’ national responses during the early stages of the Yugoslav crisis, its “low profile” policy after a consensus among its members was achieved in the Spring of 1993 as well as the lack of the military means by the EU’s European Political Cooperation (EPC) to take effective and meaningful action. Indeed, security policy was -and still is- strongly interconnected with the intergovernmental aspect of the EU, where the EPC is a forum of foreign policy discussions, not action.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{65} As Cathleen Fisher pointed out, with reference to the European CSBM:s: “If the “contextual” and “processual factors” have been necessary for success in confidence-building, they do not appear to have been sufficient by themselves either to start the process of confidence-building or to propel both sides toward more military significant steps. Rather, both the initiation of the process and its continuation and refinement appear to have been closely linked to key political developments in East-West relations.” (emphasis added). See Cathleen S. Fisher, The Preconditions of Confidence-building: Lessons from the European Experience, op.cit., p.31. For the refutation of the (common) belief that a very positive political context is required in order to launch CSBM:s negotiations, see the joint article by Ambassadors Lynn Hansen and Oleg Grinevski “Negotiating CSCE” in Shai Feldman (ed.), Confidence Building and Verification: Prospects in the Middle-East (Westview Press, Boulder, 1994), pp.45-67.

\textsuperscript{66} Boran Karadzole reasons well that “…this obvious deficit opened the field for the appearance and imposition of partial and particular interests and subjective and individual assessments and evaluations of some member states, who based on impatience or interests of their own outside and above the whole managed to impose those same views over the community as such”. See Boran Karadzole, “Strategic Interests of the European Union in the Balkans and South-Eastern Europe” (Paper presented at the International Round Table on “Economic Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe and European Integration, Belgrade, 15-16 December 1994).

\textsuperscript{67} As C.J. Smith warns “…the emergence of a federal union appears to be the only coherent answer to the empirical problem of the need for a continent-wide conflict management system. Any solution short of this approach will inevitably collapse because of the inherent difficulty of locating sovereignty, and thus responsibility, with an essentially ad hoc structure”. See C.J. Smith, “Conflict in the Balkans and the
Undoubtedly, the EU should have a decisive say in its southeast part security affairs. Certain tools were at its disposal in dealing with post-Cold War conflicts: economic sanctions, diplomatic protestations, and limited political negotiations (such as cease-fires, conferences and the presence of peace monitors). But it does not yet possess the adequate level of integration or the means and influence to deal effectively with either potential or real conflicts in its backyard. Moreover, the EU’s lack of unitary decisions and direction restrain it from carrying out the more ambitious task of establishing a regional security regime in Southeastern Europe.

More or less the same applies to the United Nations which has not been able to become a powerful force in the creation of a stable and secure Southeastern Europe. This was due to two main reasons. Firstly, its global arms control and non-proliferation agreements, while setting a backdrop for regional negotiation, ignore the particularities and specificities of various regions that can be best be understood by regional actors, states and institutions. Secondly, it does not have the unitary force and direction to guide its behavior and policies. The latter was particularly evident in the Bosnian war, where its inconsistent oscillation between principles led to a disjointed and disillusioned policy.  

However, apart from their shortcomings, international organizations are becoming in the post-Cold War era the only instruments available for managing international (and to a certain extent regional) security problems. As Mario Zucconi has argued: “... the important issue seems now to be not whether multilateral organizations are more or less relevant and capable of dealing with international (and regional) stability, but rather how their effectiveness could be improved”. With respect to the latter, a series of prerequisites is still pending. The Kosovo crisis has, however, shown that the ability to project military power and the acquisition of the necessary infrastructure to carry out serious military operations are not the only ingredients of a successful policy. In fact, the...
legitimacy of the policies and actions to be pursued by as many as possible states is also needed.

It seems that in the post-Cold War era the difficult task of the coupling of the issues of the legitimacy and the projection of power will become the focal point of any future security architecture. To this end a particular international security organization, namely NATO could play a decisive role. Undoubtedly, NATO remains the only organization that acquires the military muscle to impose solutions in Europe’s periphery. While also composed of various member-states, NATO has the leadership of the United States, which in most cases, is more than just a member. Moreover, as the Dayton accord has shown US presence in Europe was the key-factor of security in the post-bipolar region while the Kosovo crisis further reinforced the US’ ability to decisively setting the agenda as far as the extra-regional involvement in the region’s issues is concerned. Thus, NATO has the means to prevent and contain conflict in the region while its ability is largely due to the leadership role of the United States, a role which has no second in the continent. As Stephen Larrabee has put it “…there is no substitute for strong and effective American leadership … if the security problems of the Balkans are to be resolved, the US will need to remain actively engaged in their resolution and management”. However, the United Nations remains in the post-Cold War era the favored organization for the legitimization of the use of force while the OSCE appears as the most representative


Although the United States did not achieve better progress during the war-days it turned out to be the major protagonist in the region after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord. According to Janusz Bugajski NATO’s involvement in Bosnia was successful to extent that it fulfilled its objectives: separating armies, monitoring munitions and deterring combat. See Janusz Bugajski, “The Balkans: On the Brink Again”, The Washington Quarterly (Vol.20, no.4, 1997), p.222. For a thorough analysis of the reasons which account for the failure of the major Western powers to cope with the collapse of Yugoslavia along with lessons learnt on how the United Nations, NATO and the European Community should deal with such crises see James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will. International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (Hurst & Company, London, 1997). See also Gazmen Xhudo, Diplomacy and Crisis Management in the Balkans. A U.S. Foreign Policy Perspective (St.Martin’s Press, New York, 1996).

See Stephen F. Larrabee, “US Policy in the Balkans: From Containment to Strategic Reengagement” in C.Danopoulos and K.Messas (eds.), Crises in the Balkans: Views from the Participants (Westview Press, 1997), p.291. It should be added at this point that Russia’s role in the region, despite its strong historical interests, is expected to remain, mainly, a collaborative one where it would assist the United States in finding diplomatic solutions to sporadic European crises such as Bosnia and Kossovo. Russia is still grappling with its post-communist, post-imperial transition, and its internal problems inhibit it from undertaking any independent action in the region that would jeopardize its relationship with either the United States or with the successor states of the former Soviet Union, the latter being the area where Russian national interests are most directly involved. See Stephen F. Larrabee, “Russia and the Balkans. Old Themes and New Challenges” in Vladimir Baranovsky (ed.), Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda (SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 389-402. According to Carl Bildt, “American strength lies less in an ability to devise strategies and set out policies than in a superior ability to orchestrate
forum in Europe. It is true that in the early days after the end of the Cold War it appeared easier to restructure the most successful Cold War military organization, namely NATO by building up the European pillar and assigning it peacekeeping operations instead of reformulating OSCE. Moreover, OSCE’s parochial decision-making function and the lack of an enforcing mechanism has led to its paralysis with regard to major post-Cold War crises in Europe’s backyard. Thus, a certain amount of reform and modification of the OSCE’s decision-making function (i.e., the unanimity rule) and enforcement capability (i.e., peacekeeping and interventionary forces) is needed in order to efficiently deal with the new realities in Europe’s periphery. Although unwilling to rely entirely on the OSCE, Southeast European states recognized that OSCE could contribute to their security in a number of ways. This is mainly due to the fact that the OSCE has managed to successfully adapt some of its structures to post-Cold War conditions, especially with respect to the main areas of conflict prevention (humanitarian, arms control, human rights) while certain operational tools (the High Commissioner for National Minorities, long-term observer missions) have been developed free of the constraints of prior consensus. In addition, “the Dayton agreement gave it new political legitimacy in accordance with its multifunctional approach, which requires only limited interference (exploratory missions, the supervision of elections, checks on respect for human rights).”

Thus, Southeast European states supported the development of the OSCE’s role in conflict prevention and crisis management and as a forum for arms control and confidence-building measures. However, both their future integration in the European Union and their participation in the OSCE have been seen as complementary to their ultimate security objective, namely becoming members of NATO. The latter appears a speedier alternative to these states’ post-Cold War security dilemmas. This is so because on the one hand, the European prospects even for the more developed former communist Southeast European states (i.e., Romania and Bulgaria) are minimal (it might take them some ten to twenty years to meet the stringent EU economic criteria) while on the other hand, OSCE is not in a position to provide the necessary security guarantees to these states.

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action and support for whatever policy happens to be theirs at any given moment, and Europe lacks that ability, see Carl Bildt, What Global role for the EU? (Philip Morris Institute, Brussels, 1997)
73Sophia Clement, Conflict Prevention in the Balkans, op. cit., p.50
74Indeed some of Southeast European states’s pursuit of bilateral security cooperation with their neighbours and the reorientation of their armed forces (democratic control, adoption of new strategies and force structures) indicate a serious attempt to avoid provocative foreign and security policies along OSCE principles.
In sum, the need for the right mixture of the issues of legitimacy and power projection along with the issue of the extra-regional actors complementarity seem to emerge at the epicenter of any constructive involvement of outside powers (be states or institutions) into Southeastern Europe security affairs. In other words, it appears as a prerequisite for the OSCE’s mechanisms to be complemented by NATO’s power projection ability should they be effective as well as for NATO’s decisions to be strengthened by OSCE’s representativeness should they be legitimate.

Moreover, a “code of conduct” among the various extra-regional actors seems also essential. This code of conduct could be based on OSCE’s cardinal principles, namely on the inviolability of internal and external borders by force and on respect for minority rights. In fact, OSCE’s principles regarding the respect of minority rights and the impermissibility of changing borders constitute the safest guides available as for the role extra-regional actors should play in the region’s security affairs.

The acknowledgment of the region’s centrality by extra-regional actors is an additional issue of great importance. During the Cold War, the main threat to European security was posed by Soviet military power. In the future, the main threat is likely to be posed by the proliferation of ethnic and territorial disputes in the East. Especially, Southeastern Europe is the region where risks and threats to the European stability are greatest and thus, it is the place where western (i.e. NATO and the EU) credibility is and will be (re)asserted. Indeed, as many analysts argue threats emanating from an unstable Balkan peninsula will seriously affect the rest of Europe and thus “any prognosis for Hungarian democracy, Austrian and Italian prosperity, or Ukrainian nationalism will be affected immediately by the Balkan configuration”. It is thus, an imperative need for both the West and the region itself, that the former proceed to the adoption and deployment of an imaginative “entrance strategy” -instead of an “exit strategy”- that might enable it to be constructively engaged in the region’s affairs.

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75 With respect to outside state powers, Hirschfeld argued that “they have to agree with each other and with the states of the region on measures that limit their involvement: not to act unilaterally, whether to act collectively, and if so, how”. See Thomas J. Hirschfeld, Conventional Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures, op.cit., p.173
76 One should also have in mind that many OSCE members, the United States included, might oppose the possibility of the OSCE decisions acquiring a legally binding status.
79 The phrase is quoted by the former High Representative to Bosnia, Karl Bildt.
Regional approaches to arms control do have merit and in certain cases they may be superior to global approaches. For a large number of states real or perceived threats to their security emanate from within their region and hence their military preparedness is directly related to them. The genesis of these threats may lie in a variety of factors, such as territorial and ideological disputes or ambitions for regional hegemonism. Since the incentives for regional buildups are largely by-products of regional factors, it is the regional rather than the global approach which offers the most realistic prospects for progress. Furthermore, measures derived from regional approaches better reflect the specific conditions and characteristics of the regions concerned than agreement derived through global approaches. For example, global approaches that took place in United Nations fora, such as the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament, consisted of a very large number of states. Given the fact that security interests vary from region to region, global agreements reached at the United Nations may fail to satisfy regional security peculiarities.

Global and regional (or “European”) arms control arrangements already exist and affect Southeast European region by a number of ways. However, the existing international and regional frameworks to deal with arms control issues with respect to Southeastern Europe (i.e. the Forum for Security and Cooperation (FSC) within the OSCE, NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) as well as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) have failed to fully apply arms control policies in a region which is characterized by deep asymmetries and heterogeneity in political, economic, cultural and religious terms.

Therefore, what is needed are sub-regional and country specific arms control policies to complement those pursued at the global level. The signals are clear that a shift should take place by focusing on sub-regional fora which, although less equipped, are better in the position to tackle today’s Southeastern Europe security problems by tailoring arms control proposals to the region’s particular security needs. Indeed, the recognition for a greater say of sub-regional arrangements stems from the post-Cold War reality that some conflicts and disputes “particularly those with local roots and a subnational or
transnational character” can be best addressed by regional and sub-regional schemes, where they exist.\textsuperscript{81} Sub-regional schemes are actually more familiar with the special characteristics of the specific regions within they are called to cooperate and therefore more adequate to solve some of the region’s security issues. Thus, the relationship of a sub-regional arms control regime to other international or regional frameworks should be flexible and pragmatic with broader (global and regional) arrangements providing the basic framework for resolving an issue while they \textit{will be complemented by specific sub-regional efforts}.

One should, of course, take into account the possible \textit{overlapping} that may take place between existing or to be created sub-regional schemes and/or initiatives and broader frameworks. Undoubtedly, sub-regional efforts -already taken or to be taken in the future, interact with wider European and international processes. It is thus, of crucial importance that any initiative to be taken in the sub-regional level be deployed in a context of a strategy of shared responsibility and complementary use of the competencies and capabilities of the different institutions. In other words, initiatives at the sub-regional (Southeast European) level should be deployed in full accordance with (or within) the broader institutional frameworks developed by the UN\textsuperscript{82} and, especially the OSCE.

It must be stressed at this point that in today’s Southeastern Europe, efforts aiming at a greater institutionalization of cooperation at the regional level are hindered by a dominant perception -shared by most of the former communist states in the area, that any formal sub-regional arrangement will either be considered as an alternative to their Euro-Atlantic orientation or that those states’ candidacy will be hampered. It is worth-pointing out, that both NATO and EU enlargement will not necessarily conflict with sub-regional frameworks. Of course, tensions between sub-regional cooperation and NATO/EU enlargement might arise and need to be addressed. However, initiatives for

\textsuperscript{81}P. Fromuth, \textit{A Successor Vision. The United Nations of Tomorrow} (United Nations of America-USA Study, University Press of America, Lanham MD.,1995), p.64
\textsuperscript{82}In fact, the UN could continue to formulate the basic principles and update the general guidelines for regional arms control negotiations without prejudice as to their outcome. Mutually reinforcing interaction between the United Nations and regional schemes could be further ensured if the world organization were to make better use of its \textit{Regional Centers for Disarmament} as instruments for the promotion of security and arms control at the regional level. The main function of these Centers is to provide support for the initiatives or activities mutually agreed to by states for the enhancement of peace and arms control in particular regions. The United Nations can also contribute to regional arms control, promoting greater openness in military issues through the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the UN standardized
sub-regional cooperation could also help states prepare for NATO and EU integration processes.  

It seems that for effective arms control at the sub-regional level, the following working principles, about which consensus already exists among members of the United Nations, should govern negotiations in sub-regional agencies: (a) states should have the right to participate, on an equal footing, in sub-regional negotiations which have a direct impact on their national security; (b) arms limitation or arms reduction agreements should aim at reducing armaments and military forces to the lowest possible level on the basis of undiminished security of states; (c) compliance with all the agreed measures of arms reduction should be verified through an effective and strict verification regime. The form and the modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Appropriate sanctions should be applied in cases of non-compliance and violation of agreements; and (d) agreements reached within a region should have no harmful effects on the security of other regions. As an expert on arms control put it, this principle “reflects lessons learned from the CFE process where the pullback of equipment and forces east of the Urals had a negative impact on Asian security”.

Lastly, the realization by the external actors and the various international organizations of the centrality of Southeast European region for the European security in the years to come should be coupled by inclusive, gradual approaches, oriented toward practical cooperation projects. To this end, external economic support and assistance (especially from EU) can play important roles and facilitate the linkage of sub-regional cooperation initiatives with broader schemes. However, it should be stressed at this point, that in order the linkage between sub-regional initiatives and broader frameworks (NATO/EU enlargements) be achieved, the aforementioned support and assistance should not be a function of (national) interests and policies of particular member states of both NATO and the EU but a conscious commitment to region-building in Europe. (emphasis added)

system of reporting on military expenditures. See Report of the Secretary-General, Military Expenditures in Standardized Form Reported by States (UN Doc. A/48/271, August 11th 1993).

83 The establishment of the Multinational Peace Force in Southeastern Europe serves more this goal and less the professed aim for the development of a regional peacekeeping force that will be able to deal effectively with the region’s conflicts.

The European Union, in particular, could play a very helpful role as far as the promotion of certain operational arms control measures (i.e., particular Confidence and Security Building Measures) in the area is concerned. More specifically, EU’s active involvement in Southeastern Europe could entail the provision of the essential economic framework for the credible execution of CSBMs in the area. In fact, the less capable states of the region could be provided -at the initial phase- with the financial and administrative facilities for the establishment of the technical and operational requirements of CSBMs.\textsuperscript{85} Moreover, EU’s involvement could also cover some other vital issues of CSBMs value regarding the improvement of political relations among Southeast European states, such as strengthening the process of democratization and the establishment of the quality, depth and permanence of democratic values and human rights, increasing the economic compatibility among the economies of the countries of the region, developing environmental cooperation etc.\textsuperscript{86}

\textbf{Strategies}

\textit{Bilateralism vs Multilateralism}

The Cold War has managed to enroll the Southeast European states into a context of limited but important cooperative interaction by freezing, to a large extent, the various nationalistic aspirations and territorial disputes. This limited cooperative interaction among the states in the region on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral level (i.e. “Inter-Balkan Cooperation” initiated in the 1970s) constituted the main characteristic of the Southeast European sub-system under bipolarism.\textsuperscript{87} In the new post-bipolar security environment, the release of the various centrifugal forces affected -and still does- in a catalytic manner relations between certain states and hinders the further advancement of “Inter-Balkan Cooperation” on a multilateral level.

\textsuperscript{85}The common French-German initiative for the provision of the Dayton Agreement “Parties” with the technical and operational support for the accomplishment of the reductions required by Articles II & IV of the agreement is a case in point, with reference to specific “national” initiatives for promoting CSBMs in the region.

\textsuperscript{86}With respect to the economic reconstruction of the region, it is expected that the E.U. would play a much greater role in the post-Dayton era by public and private investment projects that would promote the transitional process and structural adaptation of the systems of Southeast European countries and constitute barriers to future conflicts in the region. It seems that developmental aid is badly needed by Albania as well as by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). For these remarks see Predrag Simic, “The Bosnian Endgame”, \textit{Review of International Affairs} (Vol.XLVII, 15 September 1996), pp.10-11.
Undoubtedly, the adoption of certain arms control measures on a multilateral level would produce more credible and effective results for the Southeast European region. Unfortunately, that broader settlement seems to be premature for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{88} Theoretically, this is mainly due to the fact that at least the two basic prerequisites for the establishment of an arms control regime in the Southeastern Europe are still lacking in the region; namely, \textit{common views on security and lack of aggressive ambitions and/or a desire to change the status quo}.\textsuperscript{89}

However, today’s lack of political will on the part of all Southeast European states to establish an arms control regime and adopt certain operational and structural arms control measures on a multilateral level \textit{did not impede} the adoption of particular types of arms control measures on a bilateral level. In fact, bearing in mind that the transformation of deep-rooted antagonistic structures into cooperative security ones is a \textit{gradual process}, the focus of the states of the region should be on the adoption of certain arms control measures on a bilateral level. To this end, particular arms control measures may be applied to the three parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina while certain bilateral arms control agreements could be concluded among all other Southeast European states and, especially, between the two main protagonists in the area, namely Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, the existing trend of most Southeast European states to further reinforce broader extra-regional arrangements in the areas of arms control and confidence-building (CFE and Vienna Documents) should continue and be complemented by particular bilateral agreements aiming at the enhancement of the particular element of transparency (see the last part of this study).

It should be stressed at this point that any future security arrangement in the area of arms control and confidence-building should regard all the states of the region, \textit{without any exclusion}. For example, bilateral or multilateral operational or/and structural arms control measures that would leave aside the “maverick” of the region, namely Yugoslavia will function in a void. Unfortunately, today’s Yugoslavia is not a member of the three

\textsuperscript{87}See Dimitri Constas “Future Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy” in D.Constas & N.Stavrou (eds.), \textit{Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century} (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996).


\textsuperscript{89}The other two conditions posed by Robert Jervis are (i) that Great Powers must want to establish it and (ii) that war and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly (these two conditions are not necessarily lacking in the region). For the four conditions which had to be fulfilled for the creation of a security regime, see Robert Jervis “Security Regimes” in Stephen Krasner (ed.), \textit{International Regimes} (Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 1982) pp.176-178.
most appropriate regional schemes to deal with questions of arms control, confidence-building and civil-military relations, namely the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the OSCE. Last, but not least, bilateral agreements with the aim of promoting confidence between the concluding parties should not be directed against any other Southeast European state.

Towards All-Encompassing Arms Control Measures

Each region proceeds to the adoption of arms control and security building measures it considers the most appropriate for the advancement of relations among the states involved in this enterprise. For example, in the Asia-Pacific region, states seemed strongly inclined to concentrate on economic measures, hoping the latent security concerns will be ameliorated with growing economic ties and prosperity. In contrast the Middle-East process has focused primarily on measures to increase security, with very little progress on developing economic benefits.

As already stressed, the most serious challenges to sovereignty and independence of the Southeast European states are now mainly located in the new and imminent danger to national viability. This is reflected in problems such as nationalism, minorities, economic as well as environmental issues. All these non-military issues constitute menaces to national security and command immediate action so that no delay in dealing with them can pass without dire consequences. Moreover, in an era where a durable peace necessarily depends upon continued progress, not only on military matters but on other fundamental issues, it is imperative for the region that a comprehensive approach be adopted. This approach will take into serious consideration the priority of the issue of

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90 See Sophia Clement, Conflict Prevention in the Balkans, op.cit., p.65. According to Clement: “A “strengthened” Royamont process would offer an adequate framework for the combining of political, economic and military conditionality. Future incorporation [of Yugoslavia] in the OSCE, and a link with regional tables at the Stability Pact, would permit intensification of measures such as transportier cooperation, technical and scientific regional cooperation as well as the signature of treaties of good neighborliness, and the process of regional disarmament, which promotes the development of targeted projects such as exchanges of military personnel and the definition of arms ceilings.


security (“high politics”) implied by the neorealist approach, as well as a series of economic issues and measures (“low politics”) suggested by the neoliberal perspective as a norm-building effort to facilitate the development of a common security regime.

Thus, the adoption of arms control measures whose primary concern is security by the states in the region on a bilateral level, should be strengthened by the adoption of an all-encompassing type of Confidence and Security Building Measures including political, economic, humanitarian and social issues.\(^93\) It is worth-mentioning at this point that economic reconstruction appears to be the new raison d’être of international community’s efforts (be either American or European) in the aftermath of the Dayton accord. Sustained economic growth and development seems to be a conditio sine qua non for the creation of a stable security and political environment in the region. The end of war in Bosnia, and most recently in Kosovo, will need to be followed up by a sustained effort to foster greater regional economic development and cooperation. To this end, any confidence-building effort in the area should also address certain economic elements of security.

“Uniqueness” Implies Modifications

Southeast European states should proceed to the adoption of those operational arms control measures that adequately address the security needs of the region. To this end, “European CSBMs” provide only a basis for measures tailored to the region. Southeast European countries must thus, proceed to the adoption of certain modifications of the “European CSBMs”, taking into account the unique security problems and characteristics of the region. More specifically, two specific issues had to be put under serious consideration by the states of the region:

(a) The onus for initiating Confidence and Security Building Measures -either on bilateral or multilateral level- should rest on the state of the region which has the military potential and/or the ability to launch an offensive attack.

\(^{93}\)It is worth mentioning that during the Cold War, nations participating in East-West negotiations have established three (3) “baskets” of measures: Security (Basket 1), Economics, Science Technology and Environment (Basket 2) and Human Rights, Cultural and Information Exchange (Basket 3).
(b) “Naval CSBMs”, with the primary role of lowering the risk of incidents at sea which may escalate, have been excluded from both arms control agreements (CFE) and the CSBM arena (the various CSCE/OSCE conferences).

Undoubtedly, the Southeast European states must go beyond those “limits” and proceed -as a first step- to the adoption of certain naval CSBMs, i.e. information exchanges regarding naval forces, weapons systems, procurement plans, naval doctrines and force planning, in order to enhance openness, predictability and crisis stability in the “turbulent” sea areas, i.e. the Aegean Sea. It must be stressed, that since the difficulties in assessing force capabilities make arms control -in its classic form- difficult in the naval context, it might be proved more productive to initially pursue naval CSBMs rather than naval force limits.

The Way Ahead. The Elements of the Arms Control Regime

Bilateral Arms Control Measures

As we have seen, Southeast European states have decided on a bilateral level to choose from the plethora of military CSBMs the so-called “transparency” CSBMs. This set of measures is, indeed, the least controversial of all the types of CSBMs and might include the following: information exchange (exchange of data on military budgets, on procurement plans, on force levels, on weapon systems), notification measures regarding exercises and manoeuvres (advance notification of certain kinds of military and/or naval activities involving exercises, manoeuvres and the movement of forces or equipment as well as of concentrations of forces above agreed levels; advance

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notification of the aerial operations of certain kinds), *monitoring measures* (exchange of observers on agreed categories of exercises and operations and for reciprocal visits to and on-site inspections of military installations and sensitive facilities) and *consultative mechanisms* (institutionalization of high-level consultations on military structures, deployment of forces, and on particular security concerns each side has about the other’s strategies and structures; as well as hot-line agreements to institute rapid communication between states in time of crisis, when normal consultative procedures appear insufficient for crisis communication).

The utility of the application of “transparency” CSBMs is self-evident: it could greatly enhance transparency and openness in military activities, operations and capabilities; it can help increase the predictability of military developments in the region, reduce unwarranted suspicion, and the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation, as states within the region will be in a position to be aware of military activities through an exchange of information on them. By casting military activities into predictable form, these CSBMs have the virtue of functioning as “early warning” systems and increase the possibility of identifying in advance and neutralizing potential threats to peace and security.

*Complementing and Refining the Vienna Documents*

The potential utility of the application of certain -complementary to 1992 and 1994 Vienna Documents- military CSBMs was the rationale behind the conclusion and implementation of the various bilateral CSBMs agreements by the states of Southeastern Europe. More specifically, the main provisions of those bilateral “operational arms control” agreements regarded (a) the enhancement of the annual exchange of information on planned military activities by introducing certain parameters for prior notification *20 to 40 per cent lower* than those of the Vienna Documents; (b) the enhancement of the transparency of the conducted military activities by introducing parameters for invitation of observers *20 to 40 per cent lower* than those of the V.D.s as well as the obligatory -in most cases- invitation of observers *at least once a year* regardless of the scale of the military activity; (c) the *enhancement of a verification regime* by providing opportunities for *two evaluation visits* and *one inspection* on specified area; (d) the *prevention of*

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97Lynn M. Hansen, “Measures to Increase Transparency in Military Affairs and to Constrain Military Behavior” (Proceedings of a United Nations Conference on Confidence-Building Measures in Vienna, 25-
concentration of forces in mutually agreed zones of application with depth of 60 km to 180 km on the two sides of the states borders; (e) the enhancement of paragraph 10.3 of the Vienna Document 1994 covering information exchange on planned increases in personnel strength of the formations and units; and (f) the promotion of military contacts at lower levels.

Apart from the fact that certain progress has already been made by the implementation of the aforementioned bilateral CSBMs, a refinement of the measures that are related to the provisions of the Vienna Documents would further enhance the elements of transparency and confidence among the states of the region. In fact, further progress could be achieved had a refinement of these measures on the following issues took place: (a) increase in the frequency of exchanges of information on force planning, military strategy, doctrines, paramilitary forces, border troops and police forces; (b) earlier notification of potential hazardous incidents; (c) increase in the number of inspections and evaluation visits; and (d) intensification of military contacts and cooperation with respect to consultations at command and expert level, joint seminars for border troops, establishment of cross-border communications networks joint training courses and manoeuvres, information of units (in particular their reinforcement) in areas bordering on the region in question etc.

**Greece and Turkey. Operational and Structural Arms Control Measures**

Especially with regard to Greece and Turkey, certain initiatives, tailored to the particular characteristics of the Greek-Turkish conflict, could be adopted by the two states towards the control and reduction of their arms race. These initiatives could regard the following:

The establishment of “the rules of the game” with regard to specific military operations (on land, at sea and in the air). The reference is to specific military CSBMs which can stand “on their own” without any need for them to be linked with initiatives of purely political character aiming at building confidence between the two sides. These particular CSBMs may contribute to the tension abatement, in the sense that they take the two opposing sides away from the “under the gun” logic, towards the creation of the political framework appropriate for launching negotiations. These “transparency CSBMs” may be designed towards the avoidance of conflicts, the capacity of rapid communication
between the two sides (for instance, the possibility of direct communication between the Chiefs of the National Defense General Staff or, alternatively, between the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries, on the precondition that the issues discussed will be of purely military character) and the institution of “rules of the game” that will reduce to the minimum the eventuality of conflict due to misperception or isolated actions of “ultranationalistic character” coming from either side.

In fact, Greece’s agreement in February 1997, after a NATO initiative, about the establishment and operation of a “hot triangular line” between Athens-Brussels-and Ankara was taken with great and unjustifiable delay. Furthermore, the Greek proposal on a time prolongation by one month (June 15-September 15) of the envisaged moratorium of exercises during the two summer months (a proposal that was rejected by Turkey) demonstrated that the Greek side has realized -even if with some delay, that the promotion of specific CSBMs does not necessarily entail any surrender of the country’s sovereign rights. Moreover, in the framework of lobbying on the international factor (NATO) with a view to getting it involved as guarantor in the conflict with Turkey, the Greek proposal concerning the creation of “mechanism of peaceful mediation of disputes” within the NATO framework\textsuperscript{98} -however dim the prospects of its success are- should never cease being presented, at every opportunity.

Moreover, extremely fertile soil for the elaboration and implementation of “transparency CSBMs”, as well as the further development of more complex “constraint CSBMs” is offered at sea. In particular, since Turkey is not currently facing any serious threat from sea (given the bad operational situation of the Russian fleet), all the prerequisites are there, for the promotion by the Greek side of specific operational naval CSBMs (which regard naval activities) and mainly structural naval CSBMs (which concern the control and reduction of the naval armaments or/and capacities).

In this framework, an eventual Greek initiative could concern the "freezing" of the number of the main naval units (submarines, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, guided-missile craft, landing ships and craft) of both sides at the present levels.\textsuperscript{99} Given the

\textsuperscript{98}The proposal was submitted by the Greek Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos in November 1996 and it was linked with NATO’s expansion to the east. It has managed to highlight the great possibility of the eruption of conflict in the new post-Cold War Europe and it had further underlined the need for the establishment of a particular mechanism for conflict management.

\textsuperscript{99}Limitation of land and air forces might be unacceptable to Turkey, as her current relations with her eastern neighbors are rather uneasy. However, naval arms control should be more acceptable as the only serious naval “opponent” for the Turkish Navy is the Greek Navy. As there is a general balance between the two Navies today, the two sides could conceivably agree to a ceiling of large surface units (for example: 15) and submarines (for example: 8-10).
aforementioned CFE’s shortcoming concerning its non-application on the naval forces of the two countries, the specific proposal can fill a most serious gap—at a multilateral level—while it has many prospects of being accepted by Turkey, since it is particularly interesting in the financial aspect as well as easy to assess and verify. At the same time, this proposal is expected to “freeze” the volume of naval forces at a level convenient for Greece, moreover given that the situation will further deteriorate for Greece in the future due to the comparatively greater arms procurement programs of Turkey. Furthermore, the specific proposal may include the reduction or even the withdrawal of Turkey’s landing fleet from the Aegean. Turkey’s landing fleet, which is deployed in a threatening manner opposite the Greek islands, can easily be moved or reduced without any impact on Turkish security or military capability. Turkey could move the fleet to the Black Sea, or, either at the same time, or after an agreed period of time, numerically reduce it.

Both the US and NATO can be of assistance and, above all, a guarantor to this effort, through their undertaking of enriching what has already been agreed upon by Yilmaz and Papoulias in 1988 (possibility of extension and development of additional CSBMs), but also the most difficult implementation phase of the specific measures that concerns the issue of verification.\footnote{100}

Additional tension reduction measures, without a formal agreement,\footnote{101} could be agreed upon between the two states without extensive negotiations and might include the following measures:

- Re-activation of the Wise Men process under the auspices of the EU;
- Implementation of the Papoulias-Yilmaz Agreement (by agreeing to a more equitable geographical definition) and its use as a basis for further discussions;
- The demonstration of additional good will by both sides by discussing the NATO Secretary-General’s proposals on CSBMs;

\footnote{100}{In accordance with the proposed in this study regional body, namely the Center for Conflict Prevention and Arms Control Verification.}

\footnote{101}{According to a Carnegie Endowment Discussion Paper, “Some have suggested that CBMs be viewed as measures that concede principle or would reduce pressure to go to the negotiating table. In fact, however, certain CBMs (sometimes referred to as “military” CBMs) are designed to avoid incidents or conflict in ways that scrupulously preserve principle for both sides. They reduce political pressure, creating a sounder, more acceptable basis for negotiating. Such “conflict avoidance” CBMs can provide emergency communication capabilities, agreed rules of the road, and transparency; in sum, measures to avoid miscalculation and expedite negotiation”. See \textit{Carnegie Forum on the United States, Greece and Turkey}, (Carnegie International Center, Washington D.C., September 30-October 1, 1996), pp. 6-7. For a more detailed set of confidence and security building measures see Panayotis Tsakonas and Thanos Dokos, “Greek-Turkish Relations Towards the Twenty First Century. A View from Athens” in Lenore Martin et al (eds.), \textit{The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy} (St. Martin’s Press, New York, forthcoming).}
• The annulment of *casus belli* statements for reasons other than violation of sovereignty;\(^{102}\)

• The cessation of bellicose and provocative statements by all officials. (Both sides engage in such activities. However, while Greek statements are infuriating to the Turkish side, some statements from Turkey express a threat to Greece’s territorial integrity. It should be pointed out in this context that claims on islets poison the atmosphere unnecessarily and that claims on inhabited islands ring alarm bells for even the most moderate Greeks;)\(^{103}\)

• Both countries should stop vetoing each other in NATO fora, when infrastructure funding is involved. NATO’s new command structure should be established and put in place as soon as possible, with a spirit of good will and reason from all parties involved;

• Reduce intelligence activities in each other’s territory, as well as other low-intensity conflict activities, if such activities indeed take place. Also, limit the behind-the-scenes role of consulates in sensitive regions;

• Promote a tacit agreement between Navies on incident-prevention in the Aegean.

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\(^{102}\) Since September 1994, and shortly before the entry into force of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which calls for a territorial waters width up to twelve miles, the then Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller, and other senior government officials explicitly and repeatedly stated that such an extension by Greece would be considered a *casus belli*. This then became official policy through a Resolution of the Turkish National Assembly.

\(^{103}\) As one analyst points out, “Turkish official declarations, usually making headlines in Greek mass media, have been intensifying Greek fears. For instance, the Turkish Prime Minister Demirel stated in 1975 that "...half the Aegean is ours. Let the whole world know that this is so...We know how to crush the heads of our enemies when the prestige, dignity and interests of the Turkish nation are attacked". Turkish officials’ references to a “growing Turkey” and to the 21\(^{st}\) century as the “era of Turkism” have further escalated concern. Moreover, direct challenges (e.g., “The group of islands that are situated within 50 km of the Turkish coast... should belong to Turkey”), as well as indirect questioning of Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands, have been viewed with great alarm. See Yannis Valinakis, *Greece's Security in the Post-Cold War Era* (SWP-S394, Ebenhausen, April 1994), p. 30. See also, Athanassios Platias, “Greece’s Strategic Doctrine: In search of Autonomy and Deterrence” in Dimitri Constas (ed.), *The Greek Turkish Conflict in the 1990s*, (Macmillan, London, 1991), p. 93.
Multilateral/Regional Arms Control Measures

Constraint CSBMs

Once secrecy has been reduced through greater transparency, predictability concerning the activity of military forces has been enhanced and, most importantly, a certain degree of mutual confidence between the states has been built, states may negotiate “constraint” CSBMs which constitute a category of structural arms control measures. Since “constraint” CSBMs actually limit military operations, as opposed to the “transparency” CSBMs which merely subject these operations to prior notification or observation, they are more intrusive and inherently more difficult to negotiate.

It would be expedient for Southeast European states to examine the launching of specific “limitation measures”, namely measures concerning the establishment of force-limitation-zones. The establishment of force-limitation-zones aims at the reduction of the concentration of weapon systems or/and armed forces in areas constituting common borders. The practical use of such zones lies in the demonstration of good will from both involved parties with a view to reducing the tension and the eventuality of armed confrontation. Such an agreement was signed between Israel and Syria in 1973. This agreement envisaged the limitation of the offensive weapon systems up to certain ceilings and at a range of 20 kilometers east and west of the Golan Heights.

One approach could be to establish force-limitation-zones on both sides of the common borders in an effort to reduce high concentration of forces and weapon systems that might be considered particularly threatening. To this end, efforts should be directed towards changing the location and restricting the deployment of military forces and weapons, especially those with offensive capabilities, in areas close to the common borders. The idea of establishing such force-limitation-zones has garnered increasing interest among Southeast European states.

Greece, for instance, proposed in July 1991, the creation of an “area free of offensive weapons”, including battle tanks, attack helicopters, armoured combat vehicles, artillery and combat aircraft in the region where the Turkish, Bulgarian and Greek

104 It must be noted that the validity of any multinational or (sub) regional arms control agreement requests the creation of consultative bodies to manage and constantly adapt it, and periodic review conferences to update it.
borders meet. Later Bulgaria put forward its own proposal, suggesting troop withdrawal from an 80 kilometers zone along both sides of the divide between Bulgaria and its NATO neighboring states, namely Turkey and Greece. Turkey, turned down both proposals which appeared to be incompatible with its own strategic choices. The military utility of such force-limitation-zones is to create “zones of confidence”, that is to demonstrate peaceful intentions, to minimize the risk of collision, and to increase warning time available to all sides.

The successful operation of force-limitation zones can pave the way to the creation of demilitarized zones. Within these zones, all military operations as well as the deployment of all types of weapon systems near the border areas are to be prohibited. Demilitarized zones should cover geographical points of strategic or tactical importance, to which access would be necessary to conduct offensive operations. Such zones should be extensive enough to make surprise attack more difficult and thus, allow states to improve their defense. A zone of this kind was established between Greece and Turkey on the river Maritza by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The zone was 60 kilometers across-thirty on each side.

Efforts to establish force-limitation-zones and/or demilitarized-zones to be effective should be combined with the use of reliable monitoring instruments. Photo-reconnaissance by satellite or mutual air-surveillance of the zones along with on-site verification would reinforce the process of establishing a viable “constraint” CSBMs regime. The establishment of an “open-skies” regime similar to that which exists between Hungary and Romania could help to this direction. Furthermore, where possible, such zones should be reinforced by creating Free Trade Zones to foster interdependence.

Common Security Council (CSC)\textsuperscript{106}

Misperception has always been an endemic characteristic of the relationships among Southeast European states. Therefore, serious efforts to minimize the opportunities for misperception should be taken. The establishment of the means for consultation and explanation at a responsible level with regard to security related issues is essential in order the task for the minimization of opportunities for misperception to be
accomplished. Consequently, the states of the region should establish an *official* (but informal) *consultative body* called Common Security Council (CSC) as a standing forum where any security-related topic that any participant nation wished to discuss could be examined free from resulting political pressures among certain national representatives close to policy-makers in their respective government.

This CSC could deal with a series of issues such as those raised by prospective developments or deployments of new weapons, or apparent changes in policy or practices. Thus there would be an opportunity for a country before making its decision public to explain in private the *rationale* behind its weapons acquisitions or other policies that could appear threatening to the other states of the region. In addition, the CSC could serve as a vehicle for avoiding crises and for modulating national policy decisions. Southeast-European states have a common interest to avoid crises, deal with confrontations between ethnic or religious groups, and curb the proliferations of weapons throughout the area. To this end, continuity of contact at a serious non-public and informed level is essential. Moreover, the proposed Common Security Council (CSC) could thus serve as the foundation of political confidence which is needed had certain military confidence and security building measures are to succeed.

*Center for Crisis Prevention*

The tools available to broader institutional frameworks (UN, OSCE) for conflict prevention are in the post-cold war period inadequate to meet all of the threats. Most importantly, given that the most serious security risks and threats seem to stem more from societal security issues than from the traditional balance of power problems, the next task seems to be about how to develop mechanisms that can give early warning of future conflict, namely knowing where and when conflicts are likely to occur. Particularly in Southeastern Europe which is characterized by existing or potential intra-state and inter-state conflicts, the issue of early-warning appears as a key factor in preventing crises through the promotion of certain arms control measures.

Unfortunately, the existing international institutional mechanisms for *early-warning* (as well as *agenda-setting* and *policy-formulation*) remain relatively underdeveloped.107 Yet regional security organizations seem better equipped than the

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107 *Agenda-setting* refers to ensuring that potential flashpoints are put on the agenda of policy makers while *policy-formulation* has to do with the appropriate policies that are to be developed. See Andrew Cottey,
existing UN system mechanisms to accomplish the particular task of early-warning successfully. For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities are vivid examples of the development of some “hybrid” prevention mechanisms on the part of current regional security organizations. However, the High Commissioner has made no \textit{formal} early warnings while his or her action is rather dependent on \textit{ad hoc} reaction to developments which come to his attention via a wide ranging analysis based on a variety of reports and contacts.\footnote{See The \textit{Role of High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention} (The Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, The Hague, June 1997), p. 25.} Therefore, certain mechanisms within sub-regional frameworks will be the best means to maintain a close and careful watch on circumstances and, as a consequence, respond in an immediate and discreet manner when the probability of crisis arises.

The establishment of a Crisis Prevention Center (CPC) in Southeastern Europe\footnote{It is noteworthy that the proposal for the establishment of a sub-regional Center for Crisis Prevention and Management, in the context of SEDM, has been submitted for the first time by the Greek Minister of Defense Mr. Akis Tsohatzopoulos in the Inter-Ministerial Meeting of NATO and Associate PfP Southeast European states which took place in Skopje, FYROM in September 1998.} is in the states’ interest and is worth the effort. With respect to inter-state conflict - existent or potential- the proposed CPC would mainly function as a communications network that would allow the prompt exchange of timely information on forthcoming military exercises and manoeuvres and facilitate the exchange of military observers on such occassions. Most importantly, the center would over time establish a baseline of routine military activities in Southeast European states and thus enable the military in each state to differentiate readily between \textit{non-threatening activities} and \textit{“ab-normal” military activities} that could presage hostilities. This capability in turn, would both deter preparations for aggression, since they would be easily discernible, and reduce uncertainty and suspicion that breed tensions.\footnote{See Kosta Tsipis, “Conclusion” in Kosta Tsipis (ed.), \textit{Common Security Regimes in the Balkans}, op.cit., p. 234-5.}

The beneficial effects of the proposed Center for Crisis Prevention to inter-state conflict could also regard potential intra-state conflict.\footnote{The particular difficulty to apply certain operational arms control measures to sub-state (and trans-state) conflicts lies in the fact that the situation is not one of state-to-state, but groups within states. Thus, there has to be a procedure whereby a group or groups which feel under threat can approach the international community (the CSCE, the UN, etc.) directly and be accorded some status so that they may be recognized and heard internationally. For these remarks see Patricia M. Lewis, “Confidence Building Through}
mentioned conflicts of inter-ethnic dimensions continue to pose a substantial threat to peace, stability and democratization in Southeastern Europe. For example, conflict could erupt in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia due to the economic and political transition or due to current interethnic imbalances and tension, which have been exacerbated by the massive influx of refugees during the Kosovo war. By the establishment of a sub-regional Southeast European Center for Crisis Prevention there is a potential contribution of arms control measures to risks and threats emanating within Southeast European states.

More specifically, the proposed Crisis Prevention Center could function at the sub-regional level in full accordance with its -in the context of OSCE- counterpart at a regional (European) level. The main function of the Southeast European Crisis Prevention Center will be short-term conflict prevention, namely prevention or containment of an immediate development that might cause an escalation in tensions. Serious human rights violations, that could cause an escalation of tensions, might for example be avoided through preventive action.  

As already stated the functioning of the sub-regional CPC’s early-warning activities in accordance with the regional Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna is of vital importance, since the former could not only be logistically supported by the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Center but its short-term early-warning function could be further enhanced and strengthened by early action and multilateral diplomacy, the latter being able to deal with problems well before eruption into armed conflict appears likely. In other words, it is very important a sub-regional body to have an early-warning function that can provide the information on which early preventive diplomacy can be employed. In turn, history suggests that there is a need for the OSCE itself to “have some independent means of assessing a dangerous situation and assigning blame, preferably at the earliest possible point in an emerging crisis”.


112With respect to inter-state conflict, timely information about activities can contribute to dispelling the type of rumors which have the potential to increase tensions, and rule out aggressive options. One might also link the functioning of the proposed sub-regional CPC with the need for effective verification (e.g., on-site inspection and other rigorous monitoring techniques) in order arms control measures that might be concluded by the states of the region, not to be treated as temporary tactical measures that are readily ignored or renounced when circumstances change. However, the complex issue of verification is not a subject of this study.

113See Jenonne Walker, Security and Arms Control in Post-Confrontation Europe, op.cit., p.57.
This is especially true with regard to the fact that the key concepts of early warning and preventive diplomacy are not defined in any OSCE documents while there is no systematic or institutionalized structure for gaining increased awareness of any given situation or the actions which should be taken in reaction to particular developments.114

**In Lieu of Conclusion**

The Dayton accord has only managed to stop fighting, not conflict in Southeastern Europe. The region is still characterized by deep heterogeneity in political, military, economic, cultural and religious terms which does not augur well for its future. A key prerequisite for the improvement of political and military relations among the states of Southeastern Europe and for the reduction of tensions and easing of fears and suspicions is the establishment of an arms control regime and the adoption of the appropriate Confidence and Security Building Measures.

Of course, arms control requires a certain political will to cooperate. As it is usually said, arms control can reinforce and consolidate the political will, but not create it. Thus arms control cannot be developed outside the context of fundamental political change, cooperation and the sense of common interests. Security regimes can provide a means to manage the inherent anarchy and uncertainty in the international system as well as in particular sub-systems, as the one in Southeastern Europe. Moreover, by creating an inclusive framework with well defined norms that would lower the transaction costs of negotiating and implementing specific agreements and by encouraging repeated transactions, they will lengthen the “shadow of the future”.115 In Southeastern Europe, the “shadow of the future” is often threatening, and arms control is still seen as a distant, if not strictly idealist enterprise.

However, what an arms control regime can introduce among the states in the region is the fact that security is interdependent and the adoption and implementation of certain operational and structural arms control measures on a bilateral as well as on a multilatereal level is not a zero-sum game in which one player’s gain matches the other’s

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114 See *The Role of High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention*, op.cit., p. 25. For a review of the various attempts to modeling ethnic conflicts to achieve a reliable early-warning system see the special issue of *Journal of Ethno-Political Development* (Vol.4, no.1, 1994) on “Early Warning of Communal Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises”, edited by Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff.

loss. Therefore, any state concerned will benefit from increased predictability and growing mutual confidence.

The establishment of an arms control regime in Southeastern Europe means opting for a complex and evolutionary process in which different security interests must be coordinated and accommodated. Accordingly, the journey to realizing this goal will be long, involving various phases of implementation while a series of prerequisites (including -among others- the role extraregional actors -be either states or institutions- should play, how the relationship between global/regional and sub-regional arms control frameworks and schemes will be formed) should also be fulfilled.

In addition, Southeastern Europe is in need of imaginative proposals as far as how particular elements and mechanisms of the proposed arms control regime could contribute to the establishment of a network of mutual dependencies and relationships that will make conflicts of interests impossible. As we look to the future, it seems quite clear that the arms control and confidence-building enterprise will grow even more significant and complex. Quite clearly, arms control is not a panacea; but they still do offer a means of cooperation and -most importantly- mutual accountability which cannot be neglected as we come to deal with the sources of conflict and tension in a world of rapid change and transition.
Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Southeastern Europe</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Minorities as % of population</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yugoslavia (new)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian 17%, Hungarian 4%, Muslim 2%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Croatia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Serb 12%, Muslim 1%, Slovene 1%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Slovenia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Croat 3%, Serb 2%, Muslim 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FYROM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian 22%, Turkish 4%, Romany 3%, Serb 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia-Herzegovina</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb 40%, Muslim 38%, Croat 22% (break up of entire population. There is no mainstream majority in Bosnia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Romania</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungarian 9%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bulgaria</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkish 9%, Romany 3%, Slavic Macedonian 3%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox 20%, Catholic 10%, Greek 3-8%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Greece</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim 1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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